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Summary: Instead of analyzing just some recent developments of Russia’s 
domestic, foreign and security policies, this article focuses in particular on mid- and 
long-term strategic trends and their consequences of Russia’s decline for European 
and Eurasian Security. It argues that Russia is still in a long-term socio-economic 
decline and it is unrealistic to expect that Moscow will regain its former status as a 
Great Power or even Superpower in the mid-term future even in the case if its 
economy and military power will improve more rapidly and substantially. Against this 
background, two other powers of the Eurassian landmass, the EU and China will 
rather surpass Russia in international standing and secure great power status in the 
coming decades with farreaching consequences for the international system and 
Russia’s security as well as for its role in Europe and Central as well as East Asia. In 
this light, the article analyzes strategic trends in domestic, foreign and security 
policies, including the impact of often overlooked factors such as demographic trends 
and the health crisis, of decentralization, regionalization and fragmentation within the 
Russian Federation, the future of Russia’s military reform policies (including Russia’s 
draft military doctrine of October 1999 and its nuclear illusions) and their implications 
for Russia’s future foreign and security policies. 
 
”... the country’s territorial integrity is one of the major ‘domestic‘ tasks of our 
diplomacy. In fact, Russia’s security and its future depends on this issue. The 
need to actively oppose separatism is not limited to Russia alone. Other 
countries are also endangered by armed separatists. Not infrequently separatists 
are fighting under the banner of self-determination for ethnic minorities. It goes 
without saying that in Russia and elsewhere the rights of ethnic minorities should 
be protected: otherwise neither democracy nor peace are possible. It should be 
said, however, that the slogan ‘Self-determination up to separation’ is no longer 
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valid. Other forms should be used: real, rather than fictitious, self-administration 
of ethnic minorities within larger states are one of such forms. This is the only 
way to avoid endless bloody conflicts that claim thousands of lives and in the final 
analysis, fail to create better conditions for the smaller nations.” 
(Former Foreign and Prime Minister, Yevgeni Primakov, in one of his latest 
foreign policy speeches as foreign minister, delivered in Winterthur, Switzerland, 
2 June 19981) 
 
The Analytical Framework: The Fall of a Great Power – Russia As the New ‘Sick 
Man of Europe’ 
When Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on 9 August 1999 firing 
Sergei Stepashin after only four months in office (he succeeded Prime Minister 
Evgeni Primakov who had only eight months in office) in order to maintain his political 
power, he dissolved the fourth Russian government in 17 months. By throwing 
Russia into a new political crisis and appointing Vladimir Putin, the former head of 
Russia’s Federal Security Service (and a high-ranking senior Soviet KGB spy in 
Germany) and former secretary of the Kremlin’s Security Council, as the new Prime 
Minister, many Western observers and politicians have considered Russia as 
increasingly unpredictable and unreliable. It has cast an ever larger shadow over 
Russian politics, the Russian population, and Russia’s relation with the West. In one 
of his latest interviews as Prime Minister, Stepashin had already warned the 
administration and population with the words: ‘If we do not come to our senses we 
will lose Russia.’2 Indeed, ‘good governance’ has become the key factor for the 
country’s future development. 
Instead of analyzing current events such as concrete implications of the conflict in 
Dagestan, the money-laundering inquiry, reflecting the debate ‘Who has lost Russia’, 
NATO’s extension to the east or the 1999 Kosovo crisis and NATO’s humanitarian 
intervention or offering concrete perspectives on the political shifts in the Duma for 
the presidential elections in March 2000 (important as they are), this paper will focus 
rather on the mid- and long-term strategic trends and consequences of Russia’s 
decline for European and Eurasian Security. 
Since the collapse of communism, the Russian Federation has achieved remarkable 
progress – at least at the first glance. Today Russians can freely decide their own 
future. Democracy and market economy have taken root, though it is insufficient and 
often in a way that is rather disappointing. Meanwhile, the majority of people have 
lost hope and feel increasingly humiliated. Simultaneously, Russia is confronted with 
widespread corruption and organized crime from top to bottom. The essence of a real 
functioning democracy is lacking: an assured, law-based process for political 
decision-making and for protecting human and civil rights.  
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In addition, the financial collapse of August 1998 has shattered all hopes in Russia 
for an economic revival in the short-term perspective. To some extent, it also marked 
the failure of the West’s policy and its often unrealistic expectations during the last 
seven years, to transform Russia rapidly into a normal Western power with a pluralist 
democracy and a well-functioning market economy within a decade.  
However, Russia is not lost as some Western commentators and politicians seem to 
believe.3 It is necessary to see Russia’s tragedy in its transformation processes – 
with all its negative circumstances –  in a rather longer historical process. To some 
extent, the economic and social gap between Russia and the West is a constant topic 
of discussion within Russia since Peter the Great. But even ‘market-economy 
reforms’ (so to speak) since 1991 have not led to a real revival of the economy and 
significant improvement in living standards, but rather to a permanent stagnation. 
In this regard, it is necessary to remember that Russia’s economic weakness and 
insufficiencies did not begin with the Yeltsin-era or with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. The Soviet Union was already in the mid-70s in an era of 
‘stagnation’.4 Since that time, Russia’s power status in the world and in Europe has 
continuously declined. But it took another ten years before the new Soviet leadership 
under Gorbachev initiated a reform policy which ultimately destroyed the old 
economic and political system. Against this wider historical background, the question 
of the future of Russia’s power and its status in the world as well as in Europe has to 
be addressed and discussed. Presently, Russia seems still in a long-term decline and 
it is unrealistic that Moscow will regain its former status as Great Power of the first 
rank in the mid-term future even if its economy and military improve rapidly and 
substantially (which seems rather unlikely).  
Two other powers of the Eurasian landmass, the European Union and China will 
likely surpass Russia in international standing and secure superpower status in the 
coming decades with far-reaching consequences for the international system and 
Russia’s security as well as its role in Europe.5 The discussion of China’s forthcoming 
admission to the WTO has already highlighted these strategic changes underway on 
the regional and global level. It may widen the gap between major trading partners 
(including China) and those countries (such as Russia) which are still outside of the 
global trade organization and have missed the opportunities they (such as Moscow) 
had some years ago. 
These strategic trends have, indeed, historical dimensions. Although the further 
decline of the Russian Federation will increase numerous security challenges for the 
West and Europe, it also offers new opportunities for mutual cooperation which might 
help to prevent a breakup of the Russian Federation or any other extreme outcome – 
 
 90 
if both sides will use the opportunity. At the same time, for a variety of reasons and 
despite its military-technological superiority, its vigorous and mostly successful 
diplomacies and its excellent economic long-term prospects, American dominance 
over the international political system (‘Pax Americana’), nonetheless,  will 
progressively fade during the twenty-first century. In the mid-term perspective, the 
U.S. will also become more dependent on others which will hinder those political 
forces in Washington who still favor unilateral instead of multilateral strategies. On 
the Russian side as well, an important prerequisite has to be taken into account 
before a real strategic partnership between the West and Russia can be initiated: 
closing the gap between its traditional great power ambitions and the economic as 
well as political realities. Without closing that gap, neither an economic revival of 
Russia nor a real strategic dialogue with Russia seems realistic. And if Russia does 
not stop trying to behave like a great power, it may eventually cease to be even a 
great country too. Then Moscow and the West might be confronted with a totally new 
situation, already described by Thomas E. Graham as a ‘World without Russia’.6 
So far, little analytical investigation has been made in regard to the strategic 
consequences of the long-term decline of Russia’s power. In this regard, Paul 
Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers remains relevant in this context.7 
According to his conclusions, the relative strengths of the leading nations in world 
affairs never remain constant due to the fact of the uneven rate of growth among 
different societies and of the technological as well as organizational breakthroughs. 
Once this productive capacity is enhanced, they find it easier to sustain the burdens 
of paying for large-scale armies and fleets. If, however, too large a proportion of the 
state’s resources is diverted from the creation of wealth and allocated instead to 
military purposes, it might lead to a weakening of national power in the long-term 
perspective. Furthermore, an ‘imperial overstretch’ increases the risk that the 
potential benefits from external expansion may be outweighed by the expense of this 
strategic aim.  
Russia’s economic weaknesses and unsolved domestic problems are manifest8 as 
follows: 
 
• Even before the collapse of Russia’s financial system in August 1998,  according 
to World Bank calculations, Russia’s economy would have been about as big as 
Spain’s, but smaller than Canada’s or even Indonesia’s. The per capita output in 
1997 was actually lower than in Lebanon or Peru. At the same time, the GDP 
produced by Russia’s shadow economy has risen from 10-11 per cent in 1990-91 
to 27 per cent in 1993, 46 per cent in 1996 and probably more than 50 per cent  
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during last years.9 Accordingly, the standard of living of the average Russian has 
fallen by up to 30 per cent. At the same time, the number of Russians living in 
poverty has increased from 33 million in 1998 to 55 million in 1999. Hence nearly 
four of every ten people live below the official subsistence level, defined as a 
monthly income below 829 rubles which is equivalent to US$34. The average 
monthly wage equaled in the summer of 1999 about US$50 down from US$200 in 
August 1998. The average pension equaled even only to some US$17.10 During 
the first months of 1999, Russia’s status declined from 18th to 20th place in a 
ranking of world exporters and from 19th to 27th in a ranking of importers.11 Given 
its continuing domestic instability and failing legal framework, Russia continues to 
attract less than one per cent of worldwide foreign direct investment. As a new 
analysis has concluded, even if Russia were to achieve annual growth rates of 
five per cent after 2000 (which seems rather unlikely), it would still take more than 
15 years to return to the country’s economic level of ten years ago.12 
 
• According to a new study of the Institute of International Finance (IIF), the legal 
and illegal capital flight in Russia has averaged between US$1.5 and US$2 billion 
every single months since 1992. That means a total around the astronomical sum 
of US$168 billion as the result of corruption, criminal profits and primarily the wish 
to evade taxes. Even when one concludes a lower figure for the capital flight, the 
problem reflects the widespread feeling of uncertainty in Russia due to factors 
such as overall economic instability, weak enforcement of property rights, an 
arbitrary and confiscatory tax system, and a poorly functioning banking system 
with inadequate supervision and regulation.13 Thereby, the major problem is not 
so much corruption itself than the deeper-rooted Russian business practices 
which prevail instead of a legal or business culture as in the West. 
 
• Any future process of reform and transformation of the economy is closely linked 
with the transformation of the political system. And any economic revival depends 
on improving the future competitiveness of Russia’s economy on the global 
markets.14 However, there is no clear current consensus in Russia on both the 
need and the pattern for change or any long-term strategies. 
 
• In the light of this geo-economic and geopolitical change in the ‘international 
balance of forces’ and the fear of becoming rather an object of competition among 
more advanced (like the West) and newly arising powers (such as China), many 
domestic discussions of Russia’s future foreign and security policies become 
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much more understandable. The current war in Dagestan and the North 
Caucasus reflects these wider fears existing in Russia: according to those 
Russian domino-theories, the loss of parts or entire Dagestan is perceived with 
the loss of the entire North Caucasus and sometimes even more (although I do 
not believe that the Russian Federation will break up like the Soviet Union, as I 
will outline below). What Russia claims to prevent, may happen as the result of its 
short-sighted policies such as the current war in Dagestan and Chechnya. It might 
destabilize the entire North Caucasus and backfire on the cohesion of its own 
Federation (with regions such as Tartastan).15 
• Given Russia’s size, geographic location, economic resources and cultural legacy 
as determining indicators of being a Great Power in the past, it is nowadays no 
longer certain whether these factors will really determine a Great Power status in 
the twenty-first century. And even one maintains believe in those indicators of a 
Great Power status, Russia’s socio-economic factors are not encouraging in a 
way that a revival of Russia’s power is inevitable and only a question of time.  
 
• Furthermore, many factors and challenges are often overlooked.16 Russia’s health 
crisis (widespread outbreaks of diseases such as typhus, cholera, diphtheria and 
others), is one of those issues, which will hinder an economic recovery in the 
short- and mid-term future.17 The crude death rates, for instance, were in the first 
half of 1998 nearly 30 percent higher than they had been at the end of the 1980s. 
Russia’s death rate is exceeding its birth rate by well over half – about 700,000 a 
year. The overall life expectancy has fallen in 1997 to under 67 years, for males it 
is just around 61 years. For comparative analyses it is important to note that 
similar mortality crisis in the past in Germany, Spain, Japan, and South Korea 
were in one or another way the direct result of wars or civil wars and not of 
peacetime. According to analytical forecasts, while the Russian Federation 
contained the world fifth’s largest population at the Soviet Union’s final days, its 
population will shrink to be no larger than ninth in the world by 2020. Life 
expectancy then will be lower than those of 125 of the 188 countries in the world. 
During the first six months of 1999, the Russian population has further declined by 
406.200 according to the Russian Statistics Agency. By 2016, it will be fall by 
eight million. At present, every 100 Russian women have only 124 children – 111 
fewer than the rate needed to keep the population stable.18 By 2050, it could lose 
half of its population due to dramatic rise of diseases and pollution that could lead 
to severe political instability.19 
 
 93 
• If current demographic trends will continue, the number of teenagers in the 
Russian Federation will already be smaller in 2001 than it was in 1959, the year in 
which the birth deficit from the World War II period cast the greatest shadow of 
the USSR. Such an outcome will also increase the competition for manpower 
between the Russian military and the Russian economy. It creates additional 
pressure (besides financial difficulties) for the military to maintain its current force 
structure and it becomes more difficult for the economy to recover from its present 
problems. These demographic trends will in particular in Siberia and the Russian 
Far East, raise numerous new security challenges (in particular vis-à-vis China). 
According to official Russian sources, every year up to 500,000 Chinese laborers 
are immigrating into the Russian Far East from northern provinces of China, and 
the greater part of these people do not return but stay in Russia. The number of 
foreign citizens who are illegally staying on Russian territory has already 
exceeded one million.20 In the Future, Russia may be eventuelly confronted with 
serious Chinese demands that it has to open its vast and and scarcely populated 
Far Eastern provinces (eight million Russians live between Lake Baykal in Siberia 
and Vladivostok) to Chinese immigration. On the Chinese side, the density is 
already nowadays ten times higher than among the 32 million Russian population 
in the country east of the Ural Mountains and is increasing 20 times faster  than 
the local population on the Russian side.21 Thus Russia may need the West and 
international organizations to cope with this key security challenge in the future. 
 
Impacts of the Decentralization, Regionalization and Fragmentation within the 
Russian Federation 
In the foreseeable future, it seems inevitable that Russia’s power projection abroad 
beyond its territories will been reduced further. Internal economic and political decay 
as well as military decline might assume new security dimensions. That might (a) 
increase the legal and illegal  exports of military hardware and software to a rising 
power like China or to ‘rogue states’ such as Iran and others; (b) further weaken 
controls over Russia’s arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, including missile and 
technology transfers (considering the financial crisis of 1998 with its troubling impacts 
on Russia’s nuclear security system); and (c) revoke a new internal crisis with 
international repercussions. 
Originally, the creeping devolution of power from the center to the periphery was a 
result of the unplanned decay of a hypercentralized state rather than the product of 
constitutional agreement. Because of the fact that such regional power is 
unprecedented in Russian history, the set of arrangements producing stability now 
may generate something else in the future. There is a very real danger that the 
 
 94 
decentralization, fragmentation and regionalization processes underway will take hold 
to such an extent that the unitary federation is becoming increasingly fragmenting.  
The risk is not that Russia will implode like the former Soviet Union, but rather cease 
to function because Russia lacks viable institutions of both regional and central 
government and will fall between varying vested interests of the political and 
economic elites in Moscow and the regions. At the same time, the division of powers 
between the center and the region is so vaguely defined that it produces ongoing 
battles of vested interests and thus a continous political crisis.22 
During the last years, Russia’s federal structure has been a major source of political 
friction, leverage and competition. The most contentious issue between the federal 
government and the regions is the division of power between them, especially over 
tax and budgetary issues. Such disputes have been resolved mostly on an ad hoc 
basis, with the federal government signing more than 40 separate treaties delimiting 
authority between it and single regions in spite of constitutional provisions and laws 
providing for a uniform regime applying to all. The federal government is largely 
unable to improve its legitimacy in the contest with regional governments without 
dramatic and sustained improvements in its revenue base and without effective 
redistribution of this revenue to national significant purposes.  
In contrast to many politicians and experts in Moscow, regionalization can be seen as 
a normal part of the democratic evolution of Russia that dilutes the traditionally 
autocratic and hypercentralized power structure but some of Russia’s constitutional 
arrangements and other circumstances are probably not conducive to a functioning 
liberal democracy. The democratization has – to some extent – inevitably produced 
‘little dictators’ who  have mis-ruled and often seized local power through non-
democratic means. That, however, is explainable in a country with little tradition of a 
pluralistic democracy and a real federal structure. The great majority of Russia’s 
political elite (particularly in Moscow) is seeing the decentralization and 
regionalization processes as a negative phenomenon which is often perceived 
equivalent to separatism. Hence they have paid more lipservice to regional autonomy 
rather than having accepted genuine federalism. Both the elite in Moscow as well as 
in the regions have almost no experience in creating a federalist state from below 
and not from the top. They largely do not see and understand the 
regionalization/decentralization as a chance to build a real and viable 
federalist/confederalist state from below.  
Furthermore, they overlook the globalization trends in economic-political affairs which 
are strengthening those processes regardless what Russia is doing. Thus while in 
economic affairs, Russia is already on the way to a confederalist state, politically it is 
quite different. In this regard, there is another gap between traditional tendencies to 
maintain a strong unified, federal state and the economic trends of globalization 
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which are favoring a further decentralization and regionalization in the coming years 
and decades.  
During the last decade, the Russian economy has become more and more 
fragmented, thereby undermining the effectiveness of policies designed for 
nationwide effect and imposing heavy burdens on the central government to develop 
highly differentiated regional policies. This is more than ever necessary because 
recent the socio-economic development has resulted in increasing differences 
between the regions. Each has quite different characteristics in terms of its political 
and economic profile. The increasing diversity of decisions by regional leaders will 
make it even more of a challenge for the central government to devise any single 
policy for the entire country in the future. Meanwhile, the diversity has often become 
even greater than their differences with Moscow. Accordingly, the impact of the 
Russian financial crisis has been felt in varying decrees throughout the Russian 
Federation.  
But the economic crisis has prompted a further shift in decision-making away from 
the center and toward provinces. Hence some of Russia’s 89 regions have 
announced various emergency plans to cope with the rapidly deteriorating situation in 
the absence of direction from the federal government. However, although the center-
periphery relationship has been redefined by the regionalization processes 
underway, by the bitter inter-clan rivalries and governmental disarray and ‘robber 
barons’ to appropriate vast assets across Russia as a byproduct of the deepening 
crisis, most of the Russian regions have not really become economically and 
politically stronger. Although most of Russia’s regions seem rather weak and are still 
dependent on Moscow, local power structures seem to be very strong when they are 
united and can count on local support. 
Given the overall economic crisis and the inability of the central government to 
provide the regions with the means to survive, local governments have been forced 
to reorient their attention to more prosperous neighbors (particularly in the Russian 
Far East). Interestingly, it seems that ethnically Russian regions have been even 
more active and more successful than non-Russian ones in promoting ties with 
foreign countries. Unfortunately, these new developments have started very late. The 
Far Eastern region with its core maritime provinces, for instance, had for many years 
remained a closed zone, destined to be a military outpost fully dependent on Moscow 
for the supply of material resources, energy resources and all major daily necessities. 
In fact, no conditions for positive cooperation and exchange with neighboring 
countries in Asia had been established. During the last years and despite the 
enormous energy resources in the region, no significant domestic or foreign 
investment has been made due to the lack of a coherent legal framework with 
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transparent rules for domestic and foreign investment or joint ventures as well as to 
the widespread corruption, organized crime and other obstacles for foreign 
investments.23 In 1997, foreign investment stood at just $140 million – only three 
percent of the Russian total.24 The economic gap between the Russian regions 
eastwards of the Urals with those regions in Northeast Asia and the wider Asia-
Pacific region is rather widening which makes the integration of these regions into 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Pacific rim even more difficult.  
At the same time, the organized and even sometimes institutionalized behind-the-
scenes cooperation between Russian mafia, Japanese Yakuza and Chinese Triads is 
creating a potential security problem of regional dimensions. This interplay, however, 
is not only confined to East Asia but also has security implications for Europe too 
because the federal government is either powerless to combat organized crime or, 
more often, is linked to or even part of it. It is one of many other examples why the 
West must stop thinking only in terms of narrowly-defined dimensions of European 
security instead of at least Eurasian security. Indeed, Russia’s size being nearly that 
of the former Soviet Union, it is an enormous landmass spanning ten time zones from 
its European territories to the Russian Far East. 
At present, political groups will continue to be inflame tensions between regions and 
the federal government for their own purposes and this will aggravate political 
instability caused by other factors. Hence regionalization and decentralization have 
important consequences for the political and economic stability of Russia and for its 
prospects for returning to economic prosperity. In the light of the current war in 
Dagestan, former Prime Minister Primakov — in contrast to many Russian officials 
who followed President Boris Yeltsin — had already admitted in 1997 that separatism 
remains a serious issue and that Russia is far from united. He has argued repeatedly 
as foreign and Prime minister that Russian diplomacy’s major tasks include the 
maintenance of that country’s territorial integrity.25 And Russia’s ‘National Security 
Concept’, signed by President Yeltsin in December 1997, has stressed more than 
ever that Russia’s main security challenge stems primarily from internal instability 
rather than from external security challenges (despite the Russian opposition of 
NATO’s extension to the east).26  
However, separatism as an extreme form of decentralization and regionalization 
seems still primarily a concrete threat in the North Caucasus rather than in other 
Russian regions. Most of Russia’s regions are still seeking greater autonomy within a 
larger Russian Federation rather than independence which leads, nonetheless, to 
greater competition than cooperation. In general, secessionist tendencies have 
stemmed not primarily from ethnic or historic roots, but rather from Moscow’s failure 
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and inability to meet its obligations in the view of the regions. Against this background 
of an increasing diversity, Russia seems to mowe toward an increasinging 
‘asymmetric federation’ which will complicate the center-periphery relationship even 
further.  
Whether widely discussed plans of advocating the consolidation of Russia’s 89 
regions into 10, 12 or 25 to 35 bigger regional administrations might really be an 
adequate instrument to stop the fragmentation and disintegration trends remains 
uncertain as long as Moscow is not addressing the real origins for these strategic 
processes and as long as it is favoring strong top-down control over the regions.  
Russia’s present military invasion in Chechnya, for instance, that seems to follow no 
mid- and long-term political design for a political and economic stabilization of the 
North Caucasus, might rather backfire and so fuel an extreme ‘Islamization’ which 
Moscow has claimed to prevent. In this light, it might rather hasten the processes 
fragmentation and disintegration processes under way. 
 
The Future of Russia’s Military Reform Polcies – The ‘Wounded Bear’ and the 
Nuclear Illusion 
Over the past eight years, the Russian armed forces has experienced continual 
financial crisis and steep decline as Russia’s defeat in Chechnya in 1996 has brutally 
revealed. Since 1989 Russian experts have discussed genuine military reform. So 
far, however, only some modest military reform steps have been made, albeit 
Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev has achieved some success during the last 
three years.27 Mostly, however, the Defense Ministry and in particular the Russian 
General Staff has downgraded a real ‘military reform’ to a ‘reform of the armed 
forces’ – these are not the same.28 Moreover, considerable disagreements exist 
about the future direction and concrete steps of Russia’s military reform between 
Defence Minister Sergeev and the Chief of the General Staff, General Anatoly 
Kvashnin.29 As long as Russia’s economic decay continues, Russia’s armed forces 
are largely unable to play a powerful and lasting role in its foreign and security 
policies. Even the Ministry’s own, most optimistic projections, only see it beginning to 
receive adequate funding in 2004.  
After the financial crisis broke out in August 1998, even those calculations are no 
longer realistic. The virtual collapse of Russian state finances since that time has 
made any effective military reform even more doubtful. In the second quarter of 1999, 
the underfinancing of the armed forces meant they received 200 million rubles under 
their quota. In the fourth quarter of 1999, only 31 per cent of the military budget had 
been confirmed in the summer of that year.30 At the same time, total debts to the 
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Army and Navy have reached the sum of 50 billion, almost half of the entire annual 
defense budget.31 As the result of the domestic uncertainties, for the first time since 
1991, details of the 1999 defence budget were classified again.32 Moreover, Russia’s 
defense budget was also in the last years never as transparent as the defense 
budgets of NATO member states. The 1998 defense budget, for instance, still 
excludes the financial resources spent on Russia’s 15 so-called ‘other armed forces’. 
According to Aleksey Arbatov, total funding of these often heavy armed paramilitary 
forces amounted in 1997 to some $8 billion with a total strength of 1.2 million men.33 
Furthermore, as a Russian source criticized, Russia continues to afford the ‘luxury of 
maintaining a total contingent of over 25,000 serviemen abroad. Even the USSR 
could not afford this!’34 
The failing transparency also contradicts Western obligations of international credits 
given to Russia. Furthermore, new credits by the IMF are also uncertain because 
Russia might have misused previous loans in order to increase its defense budget to 
finance the war in Chechnya. At the same time, Russia has ambitious rearmament 
plans as the report of the General Staff at Russia’s Defense Ministry, entitled 
‘Prognosis for Financial and Economic Support of Military Construction until 2010’35, 
from early 1999 (before the outbreak of the Kosovo war) has indicated. If the Russian 
government confirms this blueprint, military expenditures would rise from 2.6 per cent 
of Russia’s GDP to between 6.0 and 6.5 per cent by 2005.36 Moreover, funds 
allocated for the rearmament program and scientific as well as experimental design 
work then would consume about two-thirds of the entire defense budget from 2001 to 
2004 followed by a decline to about two-fifths of the defense spending until 2010.37 
The U.S. expert Richard F. Staar has already warned: 
 
... the bottom line of the Kremlin’s wish list is this: it cannot attain or even 
approach its ambitious objectives without spending billions it does not and will not 
possess unless it receives funds of that magnitude from international sources. In 
other words, the Russian state can afford to pour investment into weapons 
research only insofar as its civilian expenditures are covered by monies provided 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or friendly foreign governments.38 
 
While the official overall strength has been reduced to 1.2 million by January 1, 1999, 
and is due to fall further, today only about one-third or even one-fourth of that 
strength can be considered genuinely operational. Without the political will to make 
drastic cuts, Moscow will instead maintain a largely non-operational military machine 
that will further deepen the severe structural weaknesses of the Russian armed 
forces dating back to Soviet times.39 Given the available budget, a further reduction 
of the regular armed forces to some 600,000 will be necessary at the beginning of 
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the next decade.40 Although the adopted common policy guidelines on military issues 
of the ‘National Security Concept’ of December 1997 stated that, even if all of Russia 
armed forces (including those not belonging to the Defense Ministry) are mobilized, 
Russia can cope with at best just one regional conflict. And even that scenario has 
become more and more doubtful during the last two years.  
Unless funding increases, only 40-50 per cent of Russia’s Air Forces fleet will still be 
operational by 2001, according to a military source.41 Already today, every second 
aircraft and 40 per cent of anti-aircraft systems and helicopters need repairs.42 Mainly 
due to the lack of fuel, flight training in Russia’s Air Force has been fulfilled by only 35 
per cent in 1999, while during the same period of 1998 it had been fulfilled by 45 per 
cent.43 
In the summer of 1999, only three divisions and four brigades in the Leningrad, 
Moscow, North Caucasus and Siberian military districts have maintained a status of 
‘permanent readiness units’ with a least 80 percent of full personnel strength and with 
100 per cent of weaponry and other equipment. Nonetheless, major military 
exercises (such as ‘Zapad-99’) in June 1999 demonstrated - to some extent 
surprisingly - a much better capability to deploy large combined armed forces than 
many Western experts expected.44 However, as the present renewed war in 
Chechnya has confirmed, Russia’s conventional military capabilities are becoming 
increasingly overstrained as the result of its lack of trained professional troops and of 
resources for training, maintenance and new equipment.  
The system for calling up conscripts has also become more and more obscure 
because of the compulsory military service and exemptions on the grounds of 
conscientious objection, deserters, and ‘dedovshina’ (the systematic oppression of 
young recruits by their older comrades). Meanwhile, in the light of the war in 
Dagestan/Chechnya and reports that the military is even illegally using inexperienced 
conscripts to fight the rebels, Tartastan has declared it will no longer send its 
conscripts to fight for Russia in the southern regions or any other ‘hotspots’ because 
they have not received the military training for those combat missions.45 The Defense 
Ministry felt be forced ultimately to compromise with the province’s decision because 
it worried that other regions will follow Tartastan’s example. According to Russian law 
until the end of 1998, conscripts could be used in armed conflicts only on a voluntary 
basis.46 But already in December 1998, and in contrast to the original plans to create 
professional armed forces, President Yeltsin had been forced to sign a decree that 
also allows to use conscripts for armed conflict situations and peacekeeping as well 
as peacemaking operations because of the lack of soldiers for thsoe missions. At the 
end, Tartastan agreed with the Defense Ministry that all young conscripts from 
Tartastan who have served less than six months in the army will have to return from 
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the new ‘hotspot’.47 Nonetheless, as the realities of the new Chechen war reveal 
once again, Russia’s conscripts are mostly neither well-trained nor have the moral for 
fighting those ethnic wars at Russia’s southern periphery - particularly the longer the 
war will endure and the more soldiers will die.  
The latest statistics reveal that the health crisis and drug problems have also 
increasingly affected the armed forces.48 Reportedly, the number of healthy 
conscripts has fallen by 20 percent over the last decade. Nearly 33 percent of all 
conscripts are being either exempted or ‘reprieved’ (for health reasons) by Russian 
draft boards during the spring-summer call-up campaign of 1999. An increasing 
number of prospective conscripts suffer from numerous diseases and drug addiction 
which has soared by 100 per cent since 1993. In 1999 alone, the number of crimes 
connected with illegal drug trafficking committed by servicemen increased by 32 per 
cent. In the Chelyabinsk region alone, a rise of over 300 per cent since the mid-
1990s had been reported.49 
Incidents of bribery have increased by almost 40 per cent, though crime rates in total 
have fallen by 12.4 per cent compared with the summer period of 1998.50 At the 
same time, at the beginning of 1999, 93,400 servicemen lacked still apartments for 
their families. In April 1999, the federal government owed nearly 7.5 billion roubles to 
Russia’s armed forces personnel.51 Furthermore, the socio-economic crisis of the 
armed forces has resulted in a growing de facto alliance between local military 
commanders and regional political bosses – a fact which has opened the door to 
patronage, widespread corruption and weapon smuggling. On the other hand, it is 
also an obstacle to any possible attempt for a coup d’état of the military elite or the 
creation of an effective centralized dictatorship covering the whole country.  
Russia’s foremost security perception and the resulting commitment to prepare 
forces able to fight low-intensify conflicts at home (especially at its southern flank) 
has been replaced, meanwhile, by a continued determination to maintain a modern 
nuclear capability. This serves Russia’s status as a nuclear world power (i.e. in the 
UN-Security Council) as well as deterrence functions vis-à-vis superior conventional 
armed forces of NATO in Europe and China in East Asia. Hence, Russia’s nuclear 
forces have received preferential treatment, especially the Strategic Missile Forces 
(RVSN). According to Russian data, up to 90 per cent of all military expenditures of 
the defense budget were spent on strategic weapons branches, primarily the RVSN, 
which Marshal Igor Sergeev commanded before he became Defense Minister.52 
Russia’s nuclear forces are now in process of reorganization under a single 
command – which, however, is very much disputed in the armed forces themselves 
(General Staff, ground forces etc.).53  
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Many military arguments are at first glance understandable – particularly in the light 
of Russia’s financial constraints. However, the received preferential treatment of the 
newly established ‘Strategic Deterrence Forces’ and its unified supreme command 
has provoked new controversies and debates about the scarce resources to build 
new nuclear missiles (‘Topol-M’) instead of modernizing the conventional armed 
forces. Russia has already dropped its 1982 pledge ‘no-first use’-policy of nuclear 
weapons in the document ‘Principle Guidance on the Military Doctrine of the Russian 
Federation’ in November 1993. It has underlined the increasing role of Russia’s 
strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in its defense policies.54 Many Russian 
security and defense experts advocate placing a greater reliance on nuclear 
weapons to compensate for the deficiencies of conventional forces. Not only strategic 
nuclear weapons, but also tactical nuclear weapons play a much more important role 
today in Russia’s defense posture, and particularly in the Far East for contingency 
scenarios against China.  
Moreover, Russian nuclear weapons designers, confronted with the fact that their 
country can no longer afford such as vast nuclear weapon arsenal as in Soviet times, 
are lobbying presently together with General Staff officers to build a new generation 
of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons for use on a battlefield, which could be 
Moscow’s answer to its lack of high-precision conventional weapon systems.55 But 
given Russia’s economic and financial constraints, a further modernization of its 
Strategic Nuclear Forces and tactical nuclear arsenal would deepen the underlying 
problem that it would come at the further expense of conventional forces. It would 
result in a continued degradation of morale and operational effectiveness when 
Russia will have to cope with a lasting extremely violent ethnic conflict in the Northern 
Caucasus – a conflict with no peaceful solution in sight.  
The new emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons has also been confirmed in 
Russia’s ‘National Security Concept` of 1997 and in new military doctrine and 
strategy proposals.56 It suggests an overwhelming reliance on nuclear forces of a 
host of military-political contingencies (including the right to use them as first strike 
and sometimes even for the pre-emptive use in ethno-political conflicts) that these 
forces cannot realistically and effectively confront.57 In October 1999, the draft of 
Russia’s new military doctrine - which has been discussed for more than three years 
and prepared in late 1998 - was published. The doctrine as ‘a systemized aggregate 
of fundamental official views concentrated in a single document, on preventing wars 
and armed conflicts, on their nature and methods of waging them, and on organizing 
the activities of the state, society and citizens to ensure military security of the 
Russian Federation (RF) and its allies’58 has been prepared by the Center for 
Strategic Research of the General Staff and includes the considerations of all ‘power 
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ministries in Russia. It is presently going to the Security Council for approval, after it 
will be signed into official existence by the President himself. The draft military 
doctrine also confirms the further nuclearization of Russia’s defense policies by 
pointing out: 
 
The Russian Federation retains itself the right to use nuclear weapons in 
repsonse to the use of nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction 
against it and its allies, and in response to wide-scale aggression using 
conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian 
Federation and its allies.59 
 
This formulation leaves much room for interpretation, particularly in crisis situations of 
local conflicts which have the potential for rapid escalation. Section 2.4 and 2.5 of the 
draft military doctrine must therefore be read in context:  
 
A world war can result from an escalation of an armed conflict or of a local or 
regional war ... . A conventional world war will be characterized by a high 
probability of escalating into a nuclear war with the inevitable mass victims and 
destruction and with disastrous consequences for civilization and for the 
foundations of mankind’s vital activities and existence. ... 
... A regional war can be waged with the participation of two or more states 
(groups of states) of a region by national or coalition armed forces using both 
conventional as well as nuclear weapons. A regional war can result from an 
escalation of a local war or armed conflict or it may be preceded by a period of 
threat.60 
 
It confirms the lowering of the nuclear threshold onto the level of local wars and 
armed conflicts such as ethnic conflicts in which the use of tactical nuclear weapons 
are, at least theoretically, no longer excluded. 
Furthermore, Russia urgently needs its limited procurement budget for concentrating 
on critical systems and upgrades of the C3I structure. Russia’s Strategic Nuclear 
Forces are becoming more and more blind as aging surveillance satellites and radar 
system need replacement. With a decaying early warning system, the danger of false 
alarms is growing during a time, when Russia’s grippled Strategic Nuclear Forces 
remain poised on hairtrigger alert, ready to fire at a moment’s notice (launch-on-
warning).61 Russia relies more than ever on using its strategic nuclear weapon 
systems first or launching them on warning of hostile missile attack. As Bruce Blair 
has repeatedly argued: Russia’s ‘growing reliance [on nuclear weapons] has not only 
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lowered the nuclear threshold for intentional use but also increased the danger of 
mistaken or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.’62  
That was already the case in January 1995 when a Norwegian weather rocket started 
and inadvertently alarmed Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces. For the very first time 
since the Cold War, it triggered a heightened level of alert throughout its nuclear 
forces, including for the activation of the nuclear briefcase by President Boris 
Yeltsin.63 The Russian Defense Ministry  hopes now with another draft law on the 
problems of the space complex, entitled ‘On Funding the Strategic Nuclear Forces of 
the Russian Federation until 2010’, to improve its space missile defense capabilities 
(including early warning means). By 2010, the military plans to have restored the 
combat potential of its Strategic Nuclear Forces.64 
Characteristically for the increasing role of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons - 
which mostly (with as much as 6.000 operational warheads plus thousands in 
storage) have not been destroyed as former President Mikhail Gorbachev had 
pledged in October 1991 and Boris Yeltsin had confirmed in 1992 - in Russia’s 
military planning is also the fact that the current restructuring of Russia’s armed 
forces is conducted under the slogan ‘military reform under the nuclear missile 
umbrella’.65 In this light, Russia places too much emphasis on nuclear scenarios 
(which are mostly unrealistic and do not solve any of its most important security 
problems at its southern flank) in order to justify its declining world power status 
without having the means to control them effectively.66  
As the Dagestan war as Russia’s worst security crisis since the ill-fated 1994-96 war 
against Chechen rebels, demonstrates once again, its main security challenge has 
much more to do with low-intensity conflicts than with a ‘virtual NATO threat’ or a 
nuclear preemptive strike of the US strategic nuclear forces. Neither strategic not 
tactical nuclear weapons will help Russia to deter and fight low-intensity conflicts. 
Thus Russia may have a credible nuclear deterrent but it is increasingly becoming 
vulnerable to attack by well-trained guerilla armies such as in the North Caucasus.67  
But newly discussed plans to develop a new generation of nuclear munitions with 
low-yield and super-low-yield, obviously delivered to targets by both strategic and 
tactical delivery systems (such as the newly developed Iskander 400km short-range 
missile system), the nuclear part of the pompous Zapad-99 exercise in the ‘Western 
Theater of Operations’ in June 1999 (the biggest and most costly exercise since 
1985! and directed against a NATO-aggression ‘preceded by a powerful information 
warfare’ in North and Central Europe68) as well as the seriously debated use of 
nuclear (and chemical) weapons in the current war in Dagestan/Chechnya seem all 
to confirm that Moscow priorities tend rather toward a further ‘nuclearization of 
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Russia’s defence policy’.69 As Russian defense experts have discussed, it could be 
the Russian answer to its lack of high-precision non-nuclear weapon systems (used 
by NATO during the Kosovo-war), which are defined by Russian defense experts as 
‘strategic deterrence weapons’ and the new ‘God of War’.70 But whether these new 
nuclear weapons can really be used effectively and justified politically in any low-
intensity conflicts is more than doubtful. These non-nuclear strategic weapons 
systems might have some militarily positive deterrent effects, but they have also 
many negative implications, in particular if one takes into account the increasing 
asymmetrical conventional military balance for Russia:  
 
Within the context of deterrence of major non-nuclear aggression using nuclear 
weapons (in the presence of an asymmetry of conventional forces): the threshold 
of nuclear weapon use is determined by the level of potential of conventional 
forces with respect to enemy potential, and so a high asymmetry of conventional 
forces lowers the threshold of nuclear weapons use and elevates the danger of 
use of nuclear weapons even in low-level conflicts.71  
 
While President Boris Yeltsin chaired a ‘super secret session’ of the Kremlin Security 
Council in April 1999 that discussed this issue, so far nothing has been made public. 
The Security Council, however, had already approved in July 1998 the structure of 
Russia’s nuclear deterrence forces until 2010. In December 1998, finally, new major 
provisions of Russia’s nuclear deterrence policy had been adopted. The concept has 
been called ‘Main Policy Guidelines of the Russian Federation in the Area of Nuclear 
Deterrence’ and has been set forth on 15 March 1999 by Deputy Secretary of the 
Security Council Viktor Mikhailov.72 But the concept itself has not yet been published 
anywhere. Nonetheless, it became clear what has been discussed in general. As 
Alexander Golts lamented, the West knew ‘that Moscow is not going to push the 
nuclear button because of Yugoslavia’. Therefore, the session in April 1999 was 
dedicated to the discussion of non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons because ‘the 
threat of a global nuclear catastrophe failed to impress NATO, but the specter of a 
limited [nuclear] war may just do the trick.’73 
Moreover, regardless of the Duma’s ratification of START-II in the forthcoming 
months, a decade from now Russia probably will have less than 1,500 warheads in 
its strategic nuclear arsenal as the result of the economic situation and its scarce 
financial resources.74 Even the core of its strategic nuclear deterrence forces, the 
RSVN, will shrink dramatically in the years ahead. At the same time, however, 
thousands of strategic and tactical nuclear warheads are still waiting in storage for 
their dismantling. Presently, Russia has neither the financial resources to maintain a 
nuclear arsenal equivalent to that of the United States nor sufficient funds for 
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dismantling all the nuclear warheads of the Cold War. Even the ratified START-I 
agreement has only 40 per cent been funded by Russia’s federal budget while the 
present restricted modernization efforts of its nuclear forces will take up already 28 
per cent of the defense budget.75  
Moreover, other important tasks such as improving reliability and safe nuclear 
weapon use or Russia’s missile early-warning capabilities (which are in a poor state 
and only capable of maintaining coverage for 21 hours a day) have not received the 
much needed attention.76 In this regard, the creation of joint missile-attack reciprocal 
notification and warning centers in Russia and the U.S., as it has already been 
agreed, is of utmost importance for the survival of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces 
rather than being merely downgraded to just a Confidence and Security Building 
Measure (CSBM). 
Russia’s refusal to ratify START-II is in the light of the financial implications of the 
treaty for its future Strategic Nuclear Forces to some extent understandable. Yet 
ratification is ultimately necessary for its entire armed forces: politically important for 
a reliable security-policy in the future, economically as a cornerstone for the future 
budget planning as a pre-condition for any military reforms, and militarily important 
simply to the fact that Russia needs START-II more than the US does. The expiration  
date for Russia’s strategic missile arsenal will have been reached by 2007-2008, 
while it will be for the US only in 2020-2025. According to Russian sources, in 2008-
2010, the US maximum number of warheads might be four to six times greater than 
Russia’s (which will have great difficulties sustaining even 1,000 strategic nuclear 
warheads) while the combined nuclear potential of France and Great Britain may 
exceed Russia by 2010-2015.77 That explains Russia’s interest is reducing the 
strategic nuclear arsenal of each side in forthcoming START- III negotiations even 
further to 1,000 or 1,500 warheads than the US side is proposing (2,000-2,500 
warheads). Nonetheless, Russia’s refusal to ratify START-II during the last few years 
is also another indicator of Russia’s traditional superpower mentality, which remains 
deeply rooted and entrenched as part of the ‘patriotic consensus’ especially in the 
communist and nationalistic circles in the Duma. 
 
Is The Cold War Over? - Implications of Russia’s Foreign and Security Policies 
 
Even today, there is no single view on how Russia’s foreign policy is shaped, 
how it relates to the interests of some or other groups and lobbies associated 
with certain sectors of the economy, productions or financial structures. In the 
meantime, many things suggest that such groups – usually called ‘economic 
groups’ – play a considerable role in shaping some important Russian foreign 
policy directives. 
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(The Russian foreign policy expert Iu. Fedorov at the end of 1998 78) 
 
With the end of the Cold War, Russia has often drifted back to forms of militarism, 
assertive nationalism and suspicion of the West. Historically, those tendencies are 
hardly surprising. Throughout the history of the modern world, a prolonged 
transformation of a political and economic structures with decaying institutions and 
regime changes has often caused domestic instability, leading even to international 
conflicts and wars. While old institutions have collapsed, new and democratic 
institutions have yet to be consolidated in Russia. Moreover, Russia’s historical 
ambivalence toward the West and Europe as well as its latent inclination to seek its 
own Slavophilic ‘third way’ are deeply rooted in her political culture. In this regard, it 
can even be argued that Russia’s transformation and dramatic regime changes after 
the demise of the Soviet Union and the coup d’état in August 1991 has been 
relatively peaceful.79  
At the same time, the decentralization and regionalization processes have produced 
new actors in Russia’s foreign policy. Besides economic interest groups (such as the 
Military-Industrial Complex or Russia’s oil and gas industry – Gazprom has often 
been characterized in Russia as a ‘state within a state’80 while Boris Berezovsky 
claimed at the end of 1996 that he and six other people controlled 50 per cent of 
Russia’s gross national product81), Russia’s regions have also become increasingly 
involved in foreign policy activities.82 In contrast to Soviet foreign policy, Russia’s 
federal government has to take into account various regional interests in a way that 
the FSU never did. It is, inter alia, explained by the fact that since 1991, the 
administrative bundaries of 27 of Soviet Russia’s regions became international 
frontiers of the Russian Federation. These non-traditional foreign policy actors have 
complicated foreign policies shaped and designed by the Foreign Ministry, the Duma 
and the Yeltsin administration. Furthermore, the leading political forces and groups 
(or ‘clans’) in Russia often use foreign policy and international problems or conflicts to 
consolidate their own position in domestic politics (as Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is 
demonstrating again with his ‘understanding’ of being able to solve the conflict in 
Chechnya) rather than to address those foreign policy problems themselves in order 
to solve them.  
Russia has still not developed a system of rules by which these political conflicts can 
be conducted. Everyone seems to play his own game with no definite rules existing 
for the game. In this regard, these domestic circumstances and processes often 
reflect a ‘pluralist chaos’ by a multiplicity of actors (representing a multitude of 
specific interests) in Russia’s foreign policy decision-making. By lacking mechanisms 
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to coordinate and control different foreign policy agendas,  an implementation of 
coherent long-term foreign-policy strategies (indeed, often parallel foreign policies 
can be identified in various regions) has been prevented and is de facto often 
impossible. As the result, a succession of ill-connected ad hoc responses to issues 
as particular elements and vested interests in the elite see their influence ascendant 
or their interests engaged is a more typical of the present Russian foreign and 
security policy than any mid- and long-term proactive ‘masterminded’ strategies.  
Equally, a de-institutionalization of Russia’s security policy decision-making can be 
identified as, inter alia, Russia’s dangerous advance force into Pristina in June 1998 
has revealed. All formal bodies and procedures, most notably the role of Russia’s 
Security Council, were ignored. Russia’s defense ministry and General Staff seemed 
to have presented a ‘fait accompli’ not only towards NATO, but also to the Russian 
president who declared only afterwards to have ordered that advance (though he 
might have given a verbal consent but without a deeper analysis of the implications). 
At the same time, however, the influence of Russia’s military in its foreign and 
security policies has been diminished since 1995/199683, albeit recent events such 
as the military’s insistence on finishing the war in Chechnya by military means 
instead of seeking a political solution, indicate rather a contrary trend.84 This second 
Chechen war also highlights numerous deficiencies in the political control of the 
armed forces and in the nature of the civil-military relationship. Russia’s generals are 
not only responsible for designing the military strategy in the Chechen war, but seem 
presently even to determine the political strategy and goals of the military operations. 
Moreover, many generals seem to be personally inclined to launch an all-out war, out 
of revenge for losing the first Chechen war and the failed coup d’état for preserving 
the FSU, though the budget can neither support a long-term military operation nor 
maintaining an effective cordon sanitary. Russia also seems also to have forgotten 
the historical military lesson that seizing a ‘security zone’ is far easier than holding it.  
Nonetheless, due to the long-term strategic trends and Russia’s economic disarray, 
Russia’s influence in the ‘near abroad’ (CIS) is constantly declining85 as Uzbekistan’s 
withdrawal from the CIS Collective Security Treaty and rejection of coordination of 
military activities with Russia indicats. The pro-Western GUUAM alignment (between 
Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Moldova), which has grown from an 
economic alliance to include security cooperation, is another proof of that 
assumption. In the view of many Russian politicians, it is intended to sabotage 
Russia’s influence in the CIS from within.86  
Without the support and cooperation of Georgia and Azerbaijan, however, Russia 
cannot regain lasting control of the northern Caucasus or even the southern 
Caucasus. But both states have, meanwhile, made clear their intention to ‘knock 
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loudly on NATO’s door’ within five years (though this is rather unrealistic).87 
Moreover, Georgia is unwilling to maintain Russian military bases on its soil any 
longer, while the forced withdrawal of Russian border guards from Georgia is already 
underway. Azerbaijan is asking for NATO bases on its territory.88 The Baku-Supsa 
pipeline from Azerbaijan to the Black Sea Coast, as well as the Baku-Ceyhan oil-
pipeline through Georgia to Turkey agreed at the OSCE summit in November 1999 
bypassing Russia, have enormous economic and geopolitical implications.89 It 
undermines Russia’s pipeline monopoly in the region and allows these countries to 
get out of Russia’s orbit and control.  
Against this background, Russia’s present warfare in Chechnya and Dagestan is also 
conducted to defend the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline as the main export route for 
large volumes of Caspian oil. The prospects for regaining its influence in the region or 
the ‘lost southern empire’, however, are rather low. Even if Russia succees militarily 
in Chechnya, the result might be rather the de-stabilization of the entire Caucasus in 
the short- and mid-term future. Any future oil pipeline to bypass Chechnya through 
Dagestan will automatically become a target for Chechen separatists, who will have 
now nothing to lose after Russia’s war against their population and the destruction of 
their homes and the civilian infrastructure. Hence any foreign investment in these 
pipelines to bypass Chechnya through Dagestan will be  at highest risk, making it 
ultimately less likely or even impossible.  
Russia shoots itself in its own foot by seeking a military solution in Dagestan and 
Chechyna instead of a vigorous and comprehensive effort to engage the moderate 
political forces in a dialogue as well as by denying to respect or at least taking into 
account the independence and security concerns of neighboring states (such as 
Georgia and Azerbaijan). Furthermore, Russia’s desire to boost the OSCE as the 
main institution in the European security architecture has no credibility whatsoever in 
the future by excluding once again any OSCE observers from or even a OSCE 
mission for the war in Chechyna (as Moscow has already done it during the first 
Chechen war between 1994-96). 
Although the tendencies of an adventurist and militaristic foreign policy can easily be 
identified, Russia does not have the capabilities or the resources for any ambitious 
long-term foreign and security policies. As the end of the Kosovo War demonstrated, 
NATO and Russia can continue to work pragmatically together in shared pursuit of 
common interests despite initial misunderstandings and misgivings, though Russia 
felt be downgraded ‘to be just a courier’ between NATO and Belgrad.90 Russia made 
a substantial contribution to Milosevic’s decision to end the conflict with NATO. 
However, Russia’s policy during the Kosovo of supporting the Milosevic, regime as 
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virtually the only major country to do so, has also revealed its continuing ‘soul 
searching’ and identity crisis as Dominique Moisi has pointedly noted: 
 
For Russia, the Kosovo crisis presents both a mirror and a dilemma. It reflects 
Russia’s downgraded international status. If they want to be Europeans, 
Russians have to accept and openly share the values of ‘their’ continent. Europe 
is a place where ethnic cleansing cannot be executed or expelled for what they 
are and not for what they did. In expressing themselves on Kosovo issues, and in 
taking sides, Russians are also choosing their identity.91 
 
Russia’s domestic reaction, with conspiracy theories abounding, highlighted the 
growing sense of frustration, impotence and irrelevance as Moskau was perceived as 
sidelined on the international stage and in Europe by the sole remaining superpower. 
Against this background, it is not surprising that an increasing number of Western 
experts identify not only a growing gap between common interests but also an 
increasing gap shared values with Russia. This trend complicate even more a future 
common policy between the West and Russia. On the other hand, Russia has now 
shifted its primary focus from internal stability factors in the December 1997 National 
Security Concept92 anew to ‘external threats to Russia’, as outlined in the new draft 
military doctrine, including, inter alia: 
territorial claims on the Russian Federation (RF); 
intervention in internal affairs of the Russian Federation; 
attempts to ignore (or infringe on) RF interests in resolving international 
security problems and to oppose stengthening [of the RF] as one of the 
influential centers of a multipolar wold; 
centers of armed conflicts, above all near the borders of the RF and its 
allies, 
the creation (buildup) of groupings of troops (forces) leading to a 
disturbance of the existing balance of forces near borders of the RF and of 
its allies and in seas adjoining their territory; 
expansion of military blocks and alliances to the detriment of military 
security of the RF and its allies; 
introduction of foreign troops (without UN Security Council Sanction) to the 
territory of contiguous states friendly with the RF. ...93  
Furthermore, despite eight years of independent statehood, Russia has not come to 
terms with the end of the Soviet superpower by defining a new role and identity for 
itself on the world stage. It is often geared and sometimes even been obsessed 
towards denying the USA the ‘monopolar’ hegemony Moscow suspects it of seeking. 
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Therefore it favors a ‘multipolar world’ by establishing a ‘virtual’ ‘strategic partnership’ 
between Moscow, Beijing, India and others.94 Russia’s new strategy is intended to 
play off Western and ‘Asian’ interests in order to increase Russia’s influence on the 
world stage. However, Primakov’s ‘Eurasian orientation’ and the proclaimed ‘strategic 
partnership’ between Russia and China, initiated in April 1996, is in many respects 
rather a ‘tactical alliance’ (instead of a real military alliance which is not in the 
Chinese interest).95  
The current Sino-Russian trade figures and the prospects for increasing the bilateral 
trade to $20 billion by the year 2000 (as had been agreed in 1996) are rather poor. 
The total bilateral trade in 1996 was $6.77 billion and it declined to just $5.5 billion in 
1998. China’s bilateral trade with the US by contrast, is worth ten times that with 
Russia. In several years of the 1990s, one-third of the total bilateral trade between 
Russia and China was related to the Russia export of high-tech weapon systems and 
transfers of military and dual-use technologies. In total between 1991 and 1997, 
China spent almost $6 billion on Russian weapons.96 Given the strategic economic, 
political and demographic trends, a Japanese diplomat has concluded and forecasted 
in 1997: ‘China has a superior position to Russia in the region both politically and 
economically, and Russia must accept a junior partnership with China – a potential 
source of frustration for Moscow, especially given the nationalistic domestic 
atmosphere.’97 
In contrast to East Asia and the Russian Far East as well as to the ‘soft underbelly’ of 
its southern borders, the Euro-Atlantic area is the most structured, regulated, and 
therewith the most stable region of which Russia is an important integral part of it. 
Nowhere else is the danger of interstate conflicts so low; and nowhere else is Russia 
directly participating in numerous security agreements and obligations with its 
neighboring countries: Russia is a member of NACC, the OSCE, the Council of 
Europe, a signatory of arms control agreements such as INF, START and CFE and 
since 1997 a member of the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council.  
Moreover, the EU is Russia’s most important modernization partner. While Russia’s 
foreign trade with the CIS states declined from 55 per cent in 1991 to 22 per cent in 
1998, it has risen to 40 per cent with the EU (after the inclusion of Central and East 
European countries it will even increase to 50 per cent in contrast to 6 per cent with 
China, 4 per cent with USA and 3 per cent with Japan).98 However, Russia has never 
really recognized the economic and in particular the political potential of the EU. 
Moreover, Russia’s EU policy is characterized by many contradictions. Thus it has 
also overlooked and underestimated the EU processes underway to create a 
common foreign and security policy (CFSP). In this light, Russia has neither 
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recognized its real own national interests nor the fact that ‘its relations with China are 
not a substitute for, or a counterbalance to, relations with the West.’99 
Instead, Moscow has focused almost exclusively on NATO in regard to foreign and 
security policies and has never really understood the crucial role of the European 
member states play within the Western alliance. In Moscow’s perception, NATO was 
always downgraded to be just to an instrument of US hegemonic policies which have 
been made responsible for almost everything. Not only in the light of NATO’s 
extension to the east (consider the collapse of NATO’s cooperation programs with 
Russia in the summer-autumn of 1992), Russia seems unwilling and unlikely to find 
NATO to be the solution to its security challenges – unless Russian politics 
undergoes a fundamental transition as the current draft of Russia’s military doctrine 
is revealing once again. On the other hand, Russian liberals and economic interest 
groups that have benefited from Western integration had not allowed NATO 
extension to the east to undermine Russian relations with the West more seriously.  
Nonetheless, as it looks now, and even after the resumption of the work of the 
NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council, significant elements within Russia will 
continue to fear and distrust NATO and to perceive it as a source of potential threat 
in the future.100 In the Russian view, a strong NATO means the combined political, 
military and economic power of the EU and the US near to Russia’s border ‘with a 
well developed military infrastructure which can be successfully used as a lever for 
exerting political pressure on Russia or its allies.’101 Those fears could already been 
identified before NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Kosovo.102 In this regard, 
Russia’s political elite has not accepted NATO’s extension to the east as a fait 
accompli. The refusal of an invitation by Russia’s chief of the General Staff, General 
Anatoly Kvashnin, to attend a semi-annual meeting at NATO headquarters of the 
chiefs of staff of the alliance and partner states in November 1999 is another 
example for the fact that the Russians ‚are simply not interested at this time‘ in 
resuming a dialogue aimed at bringing Russia into the ‘European security family.‘103  
Moreover, through the prism of zero-sum games and conspiracy theories, NATO’s 
cooperative PfP-programs with the newly independent states in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia are perceived in Russia as meddling in particular of the US and Turkey 
into the traditional Russian sphere of influence, aimed ‘at bypassing Russia and 
weaken her position in the region‘.104 Accordingly, Russia has heavily criticized 
NATO’s ‘humanitarian intervention‘ in Kosovo and the new strategic concept of the 
Washington summit: 
 
... it was for the first time that NATO officially abandoned its purely 
defensive strategy by declaring its right to wage military operations outside 
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its traditional responsibility zone. It stated that under certain conditions it 
would not even seek the UN Security Council’s sanction. ... 
 
The developments in Kosovo have demonstrated how this will be applied 
in practice: a group of states will use force at their own will and without 
limitations to destroy the  economic potentials and cultural values of any 
country. ... 
 
A group of states headed by the ’center of force‘ that claims the role of the 
only world leader has appropriated the right to pass judgement and 
interfere into domestic affairs. This is what NATO-centrism looks like. It 
seems that it is expected to resolve all crisis by force.105 
 
In contrast to those anti-NATO centrism, it seems at least for NATO's PFP-program 
that the opponents were originally not against the program itself but rather against 
Russia being treated equally with the other East European states. In their opinion, 
the West had not recognized the future special role and political weight of Russia in 
the future. But the Western and Russian approaches for European security 
architecture and the special roles of the existing security institutions such as NATO, 
OSCE, WEU and EU within this architecture have often been fundamentally different. 
That was partly the reason why NATO could not elaborate a well-functioning PFP-
program with Russia until 1997.  
Finally, after the war in Kosovo begun, Russia suspended all of its political-military 
contacts with NATO on 24 March 1999 in protest against NATO’s military 
intervention. The Kosovo War has been associated not so much with Russia’s 
specific regional as with her wider general interests such as Russia itself (aptly 
described as ‘Serbia today, Russia tomorrow’) and Moscow’s special role in the 
CIS.106 Furthermore, according to Vladimir Baranovskij, the Russian response ‘was 
caused by the contradictory, unstable and poorly structuralized nature of the process 
through which Russia’s national interests are being formed.’107 It has also been 
overlooked by many Western observers that Russia’s non-Slavic ethnic groups and 
the non-Orthodox regions, such as Tartastan, Bashkortostan, Ingushetia and some 
other North Caucasian regions, were very critical towards the official Russian foreign 
policy and its open support of Serbia. In contrast to Moscow, they ‘clearly showed 
where they stood’ (rather on the side of the ethnic Albanians).108  
The following extremely dangerous and, ultimately, shortsighted military advance of 
2000 Russian paratroopers, accompanied by a sudden upsurge of national pride in 
Russia, to the airport at Pristina in Kosovo after the peace agreement was 
announced is only one of the examples of destabilizing actions that have strained 
NATO-Russian relations during the last years. As a critical Russian source 
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summarized: ‘...by acting so resolutely and brusquely Russia cut off its own retreat. 
... The upshot of it all is that Moscow will now have to pay its own bills’. It will cost 
about $65 million.109 The Russian commentator Andrei Grachev added cynically: 
 
Although we are not yet about to wash our boots in the Indian Ocean and are 
only covering them with dust in the hills of Kosovo, the feeling is a pleasant one 
all the same. How pleasant it is to be back in good company, a community of 
great powers – a kind of new Holy Alliance of peace-keepers!110 
 
Besides different approaches, political concepts and strategic trends, the Western 
side has also been confronted with another important challenge to its foreign policies 
vis-à-vis Russia: its policy of influencing Russia (namely strengthening democracy, 
pluralism and market economies) was often to a considerable extent 
counterproductive. In Russia, it has been perceived and criticized as an ‘outside 
intervention’ with Western advisers as the key decision-makers in its own policy 
apparatus, thus deciding Russia's future. Consequently, even the more or less pro-
Western Yeltsin-regime had increasingly to avoid too close relations with the West for 
fear that it could damage its ‘self-governing’ image. No future Russian government 
could accept policies which would run opposite of this important Russian image. In 
this regard, the sometimes very open support by Western politicians for Russian 
President  Yeltsin has also been counterproductive and short-sighted. 
Against this domestic background, it became increasingly difficult to find political 
cooperation partners in Russia. The very practical cooperation programs within the 
framework of NATO's Cooperation Council (established in December 1991) and the 
PfP-program (1994) have been perceived by the Russian General Staff and the 
Defense Ministry as a direct threat to the political cohesion of its officer corps. An 
example: while already in December 1991 the West has offered Russia the possibility 
to educate, socialize and train younger military officers at Western military academies 
and universities the Russian top brass has perceived that as a ostensible 
contamination of their future officer corps with Western ideas. In reducing its armed 
forces in 1992, Russia’s Defense Ministry used that opportunity to close the ranks in 
domestic, foreign and security policies by dismissing and forcing to retire all ‘radical 
military reformers’. Many younger officers who were at the very beginning eager to 
go to the West became more and more unwilling because they have seen their 
career chances disappearing. In this light, the West can only stick to its principles 
and maintain its policy of engagement of and cooperation with the Russian military - 
always in the consciousness that Russian governments will come and go, the 
Russian military will remain. 
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Our objective remains to establish European and Eurasian security with and not 
against Russia. However, this is not a one-way street. While it is certainly not 
possible to create European security without Russia, it seems in present times 
equally unlikely that security can be established with Russia. Nonetheless, 
developing a political and economic partnership with the EU remains one of the most 
important tasks in the near future. The West has already included Russia into the 
Group of Seven and Moscow must now enabled to play a full part in the process of 
international cooperation. The strengthening of the OSCE and in particular of 
preventive diplomacy and crisis management measures will become one of the most 
important tasks on the common agenda for the twenty-first century, albeit Russia 
itself has considerably undermined its own OSCE-policy in the Chechen wars as well 
as the future of the OSCE itself. Moreover, NATO’s and Russia’s deepening long-
term involvement in the Balkans will not only have a profound effect on the alliance’s 
future, but also on the mutual relationship with Russia that will reshape the security 
environment across the Eurasian landmass. In this regard, close political and military 
cooperation will be the major pre-condition to secure the peace in Kosovo and Bosnia 
and the stabilization of the whole of Southeastern Europe. 
 
Conclusions and Perspectives 
The Kosovo crisis and NATO’s military intervention have certainly aggravated 
tensions between Moscow and the West. But the deeper roots of this tension go back 
to the early 1990s and the illusions of the Russian elite. With the end of the Cold War 
and the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union, the old and new political elite was 
dreaming about a strategic partnership between two former adversaries, guided by 
the idea of a democratic bipolar world. Confrontation was supposed to be replaced by 
cooperation between the two superpowers but the world was to remain bipolar. 
Western policies at that time had strengthened that kind of impression on the 
Russian side in many ways. What has been overlooked was the fact that the entire 
international system has changed – partly because Russia as the main successor 
state of the former Soviet Union was no longer a superpower. Economically, even its 
great power status in Europe and Eurasia was very questionable. Its economic 
foundation and status, already been weak and shaken at that time, has been further 
eroded. But Russian political consciousness and strategic thinking was and is still 
guided by that kind of illusion and sometimes even obsession being symbolically 
equal on the political and military level with the US Instead of looking forward and 
thinking strategically into the future, Russia’s political elite is primarily guided by the 
past and its former great power status, thus compensating for its much lower living 
standards in contrast to Western Europe and the US.  
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Evgeny Primakov, former Foreign Minister (January 1996 to August 1998) and Prime 
Minister (August 1998 to May 1999) has also in the West the reputation of being a 
real professional in the foreign policy field. But he is also a symbol for the Cold War 
nostalgia and pragmatic neo-conservatism afflicting many of the old Soviet foreign 
policy elite who remained in key positions of power in Russia in the Post-Cold War 
era. He opposed, frequently and openly, in particular the United States on many 
issues, including Iran, Iraq, NATO issues and the war in former Yugoslavia.  
Unsurprisingly, since the beginning of NATO strikes in Kosovo, Moscow adopted a 
counter-strategy against the West which had often nothing to do with the conflict itself 
but much more with domestic politics and its own ‘soul searching’ for the Russian 
identity. Russian General Staff officers and even political officials went so far as to 
threaten the West by deploying tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and Russian 
regions near the Western borders.111 That kind of compensating Russia’s low political 
status and influence in European affairs revealed more Moscow´s diplomatic 
weakness (both towards the West as well as Milosevic) rather than any kind of real 
political strength and influence. The nuclear factor, unfortunately, thus has become 
‘the last source of might Russia has as a Great Power.’112  
Furthermore, Russia’s ‘Zapad-99’ military exercise in June 1999, the renewed 
Russian testing of US air defenses by Russian TU-95 bombers flying just about 200 
miles close to the US coastline in September 1999 and Russia’s test-fire of an anti-
ballistic missile on 3 November 1999, that has been permitted under the 1972 ABM 
treaty to send a strong signal of a ‘possible symmetrical and asymmetrical response’ 
to potential U.S. violations of the treaty have all underscored that kind of thinking.113 
In the light of these remilitarization tendencies already underway in Russia’s foreign 
and security policies, additional air-missile and sea exercises in October and 
November 1999 were another warning to the West not to interfere in Russia’s internal 
affairs (Chechnya).114 It highlighted the military’s frustration of losing the former 
superpower status and of seeking ways to compensate that kind of frustration and 
the declining military prowess vis-à-vis NATO and the US. Even former Prime 
Minister Yevgenii Primakov is worried about increasing anti-Western sentiment and a 
growing anti-Chechen mood that may let ‘the genie of nationalism‘ out of the 
multiethnic Russian bottle, which would be ‘extremely dangerous.‘115 
An important international role of Russia and an corresponding leverage in world 
affairs, however, requires consolidated political power and stability at home. In this 
light, Russia’s potential instability in its domestic politics and unpredictability in its 
foreign and security policies remains one of the biggest security challenge for NATO 
and Europe in this new century.  
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Against this background, Moscow’s decline as a world power probably cannot be 
‘solved’ – it appears that Russia will have to accept the status of a second-tier power 
though Moscow has still demonstrated during the Kosovo conflict that it retains some 
influence over European security. But this gesture does not solve any of Russia’s real 
problems at the domestic and foreign policy fronts. If its leaders are following rather 
prudent reform policies and a cooperative diplomacy with the West, a further and 
more serious disintegration of the state can be avoided. At the same time, the EU 
and NATO should avoid ignoring or containing Russia in a confrontational way.116 
The West should show some reasonable discretion and respect for Russian 
sensibilities without, however, neglecting the security perceptions and interests of 
other Eurasian states. Nor should the West allow Moscow to exercise a veto over 
Western pursuit of fundamental security interests. It should cooperate with Russia in 
all areas where it is possible without accepting nationalist or even neo-imperial 
tendencies of its policies (i.e. in Central Asia and the Caspian region where new 
energy projects provide numerous incentives for multilateral political and economic 
cooperation between Russia and the West) in order to prevent the most pessimistic 
scenarios from happening. On the other side, any constructive Russian leverage can 
be achieved only through lasting mutual cooperation with the West. A cooperative 
Western policy is not a one-way street — a lesson which Moscow seems presently 
rather to ignore. 
In any view, Russia’s socio-economic and political revival will take at least much 
longer than most Western observers and politicians believe (at least one or two 
generations). Many doubts exist as to whether the West is really prepared itself to 
think strategically about such a long-term security challenge and, simultaneously, be 
able to define an adequate strategy for the ‘Russian security challenge’. 
Consequently, the West has and will have to cope with Russia’s weakness and 
steady decline in the forthcoming decade rather than to worry about a return of 
Russia as a Great Power or a military superpower. Thus a continual management of 
Russia’s transition phase, inherent weakness and some forms of unpredictability will 
occupy our attention and concerns in the coming years and decades. That raises 
manifold challenges of Russia’s domestic and foreign policies for its neighbors and 
the West. If we accept this assumption, then it seems that presently neither the West 
nor Russia itself has really recognized the consequences for their own policies and 
the challenges ahead for European and Eurasian security.  
However, Russia’s decline also provides new opportunities for mutual cooperation. 
Russia is no longer a threat for the West and therefore we need no real containment; 
on the other hand Moscow needs Western support (including peacekeeping and 
peace-enforcement) and understanding for its real security threats: the ‘soft 
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underbelly’ of its Southern Tier, fueled by local conflicts; ethnic conflicts, border 
disputes and migration; center-periphery ties and the need for strengthening a unified 
federation from below; nuclear and arms smuggling and illegal arms as well as 
military technology transfers; organized crime, pollution, disease and social collapse.  
In the mid-term perspective, the current Chechen war and the insufficiencies as well 
as inability of Russia’s armed forces might force a new interest on the Russian side 
for a closer cooperation on multilateral peacekeeping and peace-enforcement 
missions with NATO.  
In the short-term future, however, the Kosovo war and now even more the second 
Chechen war has deepened the mistrust between Russia and the West. Moscow’s 
demonization of an entire people of Chechens has not only offended many in the 
West and even in Russia itself, but also severely limited Russia’s future options in the 
Caucasus. It has reduced chances for a negotiated peaceful settlement, particularly 
for the long-term future. In contrast, a wider, longer, and never-ending bloodier and 
costly conflict seems ever more likely, with a new Chechen generation growing up, 
knowing and having experienced only a disastrous indiscriminate warfare against 
their entire peoples. 
Although I myself have more questions than answers, we need a clearer and much 
deeper investigation into the mid- and long-term strategic consequences of Russia’s 
decline for regional stability as well as for the international system.   
In the long-term, new political forces and leaders will have to address new agendas 
and define new strategies. With greater familiarity and increased cooperation over 
time, new real  opportunities will be open to Moscow for constructive engagement 
and thus new opportunities to help shape the Eurasian security architecture of the 
next millennium will become more clearer and more attractive. 
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